Mr. President, there is

increasing concern within the United

States, and quite properly, for the fate

of the people of Kosovo. I wish to address

my concerns, in what I deliver to

the Senate this afternoon, in what are

entirely my remarks. I take full responsibility

for the views and opinions

that I express. I have, however, availed

myself of every opportunity to learn

firsthand about the critical nature of

this problem, including a visit several

weeks ago to this region which included

a trip to Bosnia, thence to Belgrade,

thence to Macedonia, and then

into Kosovo. I commend the Ambassadors

from the United States to Macedonia

and—he has the rank of DCM—

to Serbia for their very diligent and

hard work in representing the interests

of our Government and, indeed, those

of our principal allies. That is Ambassador

Hill and Ambassador Miles. I

spent a considerable time with both.

Likewise, I was given the opportunity

in Kosovo to visit with a group

known as KDOM, which is an unusual

group constituted following negotiations

between our Ambassadors and, as

I understand, their counterparts in Belgrade

whereby this group of U.S. military

and diplomatic, Russian military

and diplomatic, Canadian military and

diplomatic and, indeed, some of the EU

nations, are given the opportunity to

travel without weapons into certain regions

of Kosovo for the purpose of observing—

and I repeat—observing the

tragic unfolding of atrocities throughout

that country. I joined them in

their armored cars for the purpose of

this visit and then had the opportunity

to be debriefed extensively by these individuals.

They are doing a remarkable job taking

personal risks and providing the

free world with an inside examination

of this serious and critical problem. I

wish to pay them tribute. I also was

able, when I returned, to visit with the

NATO commander, General Clark, to

get them some additional equipment to

carry out their missions.

I have also, like most Senators,

availed myself, since 1992, of the opportunities

to visit in Bosnia and to study

the complex issues that brought about

that tragic period of hostilities, which

hostilities now have been brought to

some measure of conclusion, largely

because of the allied forces that are in

there providing the security so that

the Dayton accords can be implemented.

In this entire region, referred to as

the Balkans, you cannot touch one

spot without affecting, in my judgment,

the others.

Now NATO, the United Nations, the

United States—all of us —are faced

with the following situation: Repeatedly

in Kosovo atrocities are taking

place against innocent human beings,

largely innocent. We have no way of

judging their culpability in the separatist

movement initiated sometime

ago by the forces known as the KLA,

but while I was there, I saw the houses

being burned, I saw armed people, I saw

the hopeless refugees numbering in the

hundreds of thousands who had been

driven into the hills and wanted to do

the right thing, to alleviate the human

suffering. That is the main threshold.

Also, our Nation and our allies have

put a very considerable investment,

first, of the risks taken by our military

and diplomatic people and the NGOs—

those of nongovernmental organizations

who have brought relief to this

region—we have put an enormous investment

of time and effort to bring

about a cessation of those hostilities.

In my judgment, unless this situation

in Kosovo is likewise secured, it could

undermine such advances, although

modest, in my judgment, that we have

made collectively as nations in this region.

First is humanitarian concern for

the people; second is to prevent instability

as a consequence of this conflict,

erasing some of the gains that we have

had there.

Lastly, our Nation is proud of the

fact that we are the leader, in my judgment,

in NATO. Only NATO is the only

military force that can and, indeed,

should be employed if it is necessary to

bring about the cessation of hostilities

in Kosovo.

The administration has made efforts,

I think many bona fide efforts, through

the diplomatic chain—speaking directly

with Milosevic in Belgrade. We

have been joined by other nations, referred

to as the ‘‘contact group.’’ I

think every effort has been made diplomatically

in the past that could have

been made, and now that effort is

strengthened by a degree day by day of

the assertion by the United Nations

with regard to their growing concern

about the humanitarian problems taking

place in Kosovo.

But in no way should the military

option, which has to back up diplomacy—

diplomacy can be no more effective

than the credibility of the willingness

of certain nations to back up that

diplomatic effort—in no way should the

United Nations, in my judgment, have

any veto over the decision of the collection

of nations—the United States

being one, Great Britain, France, Germany

and others—to take such action

as they deem necessary to bring about

a cessation of the tragic situation in

Kosovo.

I want to repeat that. Never should

the United Nations be put in the position,

nor NATO allow itself to be put in

a position, where the United Nations

has a veto power over the decisionmaking

of NATO. But I think the

annunciations by the Security Council

recently give adequate cover for those

nations who wish to collectively act, if

necessary, to back up their diplomacy

with military action.

That military action, in my judgment,

has very severe consequences. I

want to make it clear, speaking for

myself, that I support the use of force

if diplomacy fails, and that is a tough

position to take, because I have had

grave reservations through these many

years about our continued participation

and expenditure and deployment

of troops in Bosnia, but in the final resolution

of the Dayton accords, I felt

that I would lend my support, and did,

for the putting in of the SFOR and

IFOR forces. They have, as I say, to

some modest degree, achieved the milestones

set out in the Dayton accords.

But, in my judgment, of course, we

took a step backward, regrettably, as a

consequence of the recent elections.

Nevertheless, always focus on the considerable

investment we have put in

that region and how that investment

can be jeopardized unless the Kosovo

situation is stopped in terms of the

atrocities.

How do we do it? My concern is the

discussion in the open thus far—and I

have availed myself of classified

sources and I will only address the

open discussion—is that the use of air

power will bring about a situation

whereby Milosevic in Belgrade will

cease the directions and cease sending

the Serb Army and the police associated

with the Serb Army to stop perpetrating

these atrocities. I think if

that air power were absolutely and unequivocally

of a magnitude that could

get that attention, then it would work.

But, in my judgment, air alone will not

satisfy the situation.

There is a very interesting fact of

Kosovo that is well known: that the

Kosovar Albanians number about 90

percent of the population, and 10 percent

are of Serb ethnicity. Yet, for the

past several years, ever since Milosevic

I think wrongfully stripped Kosovo

province of a certain degree of its autonomy

years ago, the Serbians have

pretty well controlled that region. And

they have used repressive forces

against the Kosovars for years.

This insurrection did not happen

overnight. It has been coming on for

many years. I visited Kosovo in 1991

with Senator Dole, with Senator NICKLES,

and others. We went into that region.

And we saw with our own eyes

the tension that was developing. But

the point I wish to make, the air operation,

I am confident, could be of such

a magnitude as to seal off and stop the

flow of supplies, the professional Army

and, indeed, I think many of the supplemental

police forces that have come

down from Serbia to perpetrate these

atrocities. That can be done.

But then we leave a region which is

affiliated largely 90 percent with the

Kosovar Albanians pitted against the

10 percent remnants of the Serbian

force. And it is my judgment that that

situation would quickly destabilize and

you would experience atrocities of a

greater magnitude than are taking

place in the recent weeks and, indeed,

for many, many months in that region.

I want to point out these atrocities,

the greater proportion of the atrocities,

I think, are directly linked to

Milosevic and the Serbian interests.

But there have been instances where

the Kosovar Albanians have perpetrated

atrocities of a comparable

magnitude in viciousness, but of course

not in a magnitude of totality of loss of

life in that region. So both sides come

to this problem not with clean hands at

all, in my judgment.

The Kosovar Albanians have as one

of their objectives a greater Albania.

You have virtual anarchy now in Albania.

You have large populations of the

refugees that have left Albania in Montenegro.

That is destabilized. You have

some in Macedonia. Indeed, these refugees

are throughout this region. And in

the event that force has to be used as

a consequence of the failure of diplomatic

efforts, my concern is that the

KLA will view that as the allies, the

nations of NATO, coming to their aid

and supporting their long-term goal of

a greater Albania. That is very troublesome,

Mr. President, very troublesome.

That is why I believe—and, again, it

is my judgment—that any military action

to bring about a cessation of the

current level of atrocities in Kosovo

has to be associated with what I call a

ground element or a stabilizing force

that would prevent a greater level of

insurrection amongst the populations

of predominantly 90 percent Kosovar

Albanians and 10 percent Serbs.

Fine. I ask unanimous

consent for additional time.

I see that my distinguished

colleague from Oklahoma is

here. I could finish in 6 or 7 minutes.

Fine. I will resume my

remarks.

Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent for 10 minutes.

Mr. President, I go

back to the situation and recap quickly.

As I look at what is in the open, as

I say, reported in the New York Times,

the Washington Post—and recently we

have had some excellent reporting

about the military options being examined

by NATO—they either intentionally

or otherwise leave out any reference

to a stabilizing force and the

need for that force in Kosovo. And that

is the basic reason why I take the floor

of the Senate today, to express my own

professional judgment that any air operation

to alleviate the suffering here

has to have, very speedily, a follow-up

ground presence in Kosovo to prevent

what I predict would be an increased

clash among these peoples with the absence

of a stabilizing force.

I think it is very important that the

President, if he is contemplating the

use of force, together with the heads of

state of other nations, come to the

Congress, come to the American people

and point out—if I am wrong, point it

out. But I have consulted a great many

people about this situation. As I say, I

saw it myself weeks ago. The hatred

between the Kosovar Albanians and the

remnants of the Serbs that are still

there is incredible. It is beyond the

ability of anybody really to explain it.

They will fall upon themselves as they

come down out of these hills.

There are maybe as much as a quarter

of a million people—refugees—in

these hills. When they return to their

villages and homes, which I saw, which

are burned and destroyed, and see the

looting and the destruction, both of

human beings and property, they will

be incensed, and I think they will turn

to fighting themselves. And that is a

situation we cannot allow to happen as

a consequence of an air operation there

and in other areas of that region.

It would bring about greater instability,

in my judgment, in Bosnia, that

sort of insurrection. It could bring it

about in Macedonia. It could feed into

the instability here. Montenegro is an

integral part of Serbia. There is a good

deal of competition between the head

of state and government in Montenegro

and Milosevic in Serbia. And that situation

would be exacerbated.

You must always remember, if airstrikes

go against the Serbs, Greece

historically has had long relationships

with Serbia, as has Russia. Russia now

has a very important part of the military

that is stationed in Bosnia. What

are the consequences that will flow

with those two nations if we strike

against Serbia?

So I basically conclude my remarks

by saying that I think that any operation

will have to explain why it is the

judgment of those preparing this operation

that the ground element is not

necessary before this Senator is going

to sign off and lend his support.

In my judgment, it is an essential

part of any operation to prevent what I

predict would be a greater increase of

tragedies there. Nevertheless, with the

absence of the Serbian Army and the

police, other fighting would quickly

fall behind.

Furthermore, if you are to help these

quarter of a million refugees, you have

to bring in food, medicine, supplies and

shelter. How could these be brought in

if there is a virtual civil war going on?

Therefore, without a stabilizing force,

you are not going to be able to get the

NGO support and such other support

that is essential to be brought to bear

in that region in the coming weeks, as

weather closes in on these hopeless,

hapless people who are now confined in

the hills.

Furthermore, if you start bombing in

this region, that will create another

group of refugees who will begin to flee

from the sites that either have been

bombed or sites that are likely to be

bombed if the first raid or the second

raid doesn’t succeed. So the quarter

million down here will grow in number

by many more refugees in this situation.

Then they will start, in my judgment,

flowing across the borders.

I do not believe to the extent this

plan has been discussed in the open—

largely by the press—that this is a

workable operation. At this time I

could not lend my support, although I

support a plan that would bring about

the cessation of this tragic killing that

is going on in Kosovo. The likely and

precipitous undermining of what

progress we have made in Bosnia and

the fact that NATO would be viewed as

not fulfilling its mission under the

leadership of the United States are the

reasons compelling us to look at this

operation.

If we are going to do it, let’s make

certain we do it properly to achieve the

goals of humanitarian relief and the

lessening of the killings.

I yield the floor.

Mr. President, I thank

my distinguished colleague and friend.

I wish to commend the leadership of

Senator LOTT and yourself, Senator

HELMS, Senator THURMOND, Senator

DOMENICI, Senator MCCAIN, and many

of us who have quietly begun to try to

look at this situation, to give constructive

advice to Senator LOTT and yourself.

I think that, hopefully, that message

will get to the administration.

At the moment, I am expressing my

own view. I am not satisfied with what

I have seen in the open about this plan.

I think it has to incorporate pieces

which will bring about a stabilization

of the potential conflict that could

take place in the aftermath of an airstrike.

The Senator rightly points out we

had the Joint Chiefs before the Armed

Services Committee the other day

seeking additional funds for critical

needs in our forces, and we have now

expended by our Nation up to $9 billion

in Bosnia—much of that coming out of

the military budget. It is

unprogrammed, unbudgeted. We are

taking funds out of R&D, operation and

maintenance accounts. That has a direct

adverse effect on the readiness and

the lifestyle of our men and women in

the Armed Forces.

We will take steps to correct that,

but I think the Senator is absolutely

right. I thank the Senator and the distinguished

majority leader for the

work they have done.

I thank my colleague

for bringing that up. I participated, of

course, in those briefings.

I am not here to advocate the U.S.

ground forces in Kosovo. It seems to

me if there is an air operation that the

United States—because of its particular

type of aircraft and munitions—

would have to take a lead in that and

then the role of the stabilization force

should fall to other allies, in my judgment.

I think you can’t have one without

the other.

I thank my colleague.